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1.  Introduction 
This note is mainly based on a short interview with Thomas C. Schelling (TCS), who shared 
the Nobel Prize with Robert J. Aumann in 2005. The interview took place on 06.03.2001 at 
University of Maryland, College Park, USA. It consists of two parts. The first part is about 
his interpretation of game theory, particularly about the use of game-theoretic models in 
explaining the origin and maintenance of conventions, and norms. The second part is on the 
origin of Schelling’s influential checkerboard model of residential segregation, particularly 
about his approach to modeling social phenomena exemplified by this model. Each part starts 
with a short introduction. The note ends with some concluding remarks.  
2.  The Interpretation of Game Theory 
The classical interpretation of game theory is that games should represent the physical and 
institutional rules of the game in the real world. Yet game-theoretic models do not generally 
reflect the physical and institutional rules in the real world, rather the rules of the game are 
usually the invention of the theorist (Janssen1998: 23). That is, game-theoretic models do not 
provide a description of the environment within which a particular result (e.g., a particular 
convention) has emerged, they rather abstract from such factors. An alternative interpretation 
is that ‘to make sense a game should present the way in which individuals (players of the 
game) conceive the situation’ (Rubinstein 1991). Of course, game-theoretic models portray 
the way in which model agents perceive the hypothetical scenario described by the theorist. 
Yet they do not represent the way in which real individuals perceive the problem situation in 
the real world. Rather, most of them represent the way in which (hyper or boundedly) rational 
agents may perceive the conjectured situation. Moreover, most of evolutionary game theory 
(e.g., replicator dynamics) portrays individual agents as pre-programmed machines. Hence, 
the  perceptions  of  the  real  agents  have  no  role  in  these  models.  Generally,  the  theorist 
presumes that agents would perceive the situation in a certain manner and then examine the 
results of this presumption. Thus, the interpretation that games represent how agents perceive 
the situation does not apply.  
Thomas  C.  Schelling  provides  another  interpretation  of  game  theory.  He  argues  that  it 
provides a framework for analysis (e.g., see Schelling 1984a). He suggests that game theory 
does not describe “how people make decisions but a deductive theory about the conditions 
that their decisions would have to meet in order to be considered rational” (Schelling 1984a: 
215)  it  may  be  “valuable  not  as  ‘instant  theory’  just  waiting  to  be  applied  but  as  a 
framework”  (Schelling  1984a:  241).
1  Schelling  thinks  that  “game  theory  is  intellectually 
useful, but at the most elementary level.” Given this remark it is interesting to know what he 
thinks about “advanced” game theory. 
2.1. Interview: Part I 
NEA:  In  your  interview  with  Richard  Swedberg  (1990)  you  say  that  “game  theory  is 
intellectually useful, but at the most elementary level.” What do you mean by “intellectually 
useful” and why at the most elementary level? Can you please explicate that? 
TCS: In general, when I am thinking about threats and promises, institutional arrangements 
for making commitments, things like exchange of hostages, and problems like the surprise 
attack problem, I found that elementary game theory—so elementary that I hardly want to 
                                                 
1   Also see Binmore et al. (1993a: 8) which argues that game theory is a tool of investigation. It is like thought 
experiments in that it helps us conjecture about the type of theorem that might be true.   2 
call  it  game  theory,  just  being  able  to  identify  questions,  outcomes,  payoffs,  and  maybe 
putting them into a matrix – was extremely helpful. I am teaching classes now, I can give the 
students a very simple problem, and they just can not possibly handle it. And I say, “look, 
you have two individuals, each has just a pair of choices, we can make a matrix, with four 
cells, four outcomes”, and I tell them, “look at it and now tell me what you see.” Pretty soon 
they  learn  to  look  for  dominant  strategies,  they  learn  to  look  at  equilibria,  they learn  to 
conceive if one has a dominant strategy, what that does to the other’s choices. They can talk 
about whether it makes any difference if they choose simultaneously, or if one goes first. All 
these things they can talk about suddenly. Before they had the matrix they did not know how 
to arrange the data of the problem, so they could visualize it or manipulate it.  
I use the following analogy: the greatest advance in business management is double-entry 
bookkeeping,  and  the  greatest  advance  in  mathematics  is  the  equal  sign,  the  algebraic 
concept. I think the greatest contribution of game theory has been the payoff matrix. The 
payoff matrix, even a payoff matrix that is infinitely large if the choices are ordered, gives so 
many ways to see the structure of the problem. I would say, just the payoff matrix for the 
people in sociology, political science, law, and economics, can be immensely important.  
Going  on  from  there  you  can  develop  some  concepts,  like  the  equilibrium  concept,  the 
concept of dominated or dominant strategies, the idea of multiple equilibria, the idea that 
sometimes you can find solutions by casting out successively dominated choices. All of these 
things I find very helpful, and I teach them to the students. I tell them “someday you may find 
this useful.” About equilibrium, you think of it as simply a pair of expectations that lead to 
the behavior that fulfill the expectations. This is so elementary that nobody would ever give it 
a name like game theory. There are all kinds of concepts that do not get such cute names.  
I have about twelve books on game theory, but only a couple of them that I find useful to me 
as  an  economist.  (That's  not  counting  Duncan  Luce  and  Howard  Raiffa's  "Games  and 
Decisions," 1957, which is about the most useful book I ever read.) Most of them I find to be 
so  entranced  by  very  sophisticated  concepts,  but  it  is  very  hard  for  them  to  find  any 
applications.  David  Kreps,  at  Stanford,  does  useful  work,  and  Roger  Meyerson,  at 
Northwestern, and they, I think, try very hard to make game theory accessible to a student, to 
show how it can be used. People keep saying that game theory revolutionized economics in 
the last fifteen or twenty years.  I really do not see that. It is partly that, much of what they do 
is hard for me to read and understand, and usually do not bother. There may be more there 
then I can appreciate.  
But  if  you  look  at  the Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution,  which  started  in  1957,  and  it  has 
published a lot of very elementary game theory. In fact it used to have a regular section on 
game-theoretic ideas. You can look through there, and you could see a lot of game theory, but 
all extremely elementary stuff. 
NEA: So, then, what do you think about ‘evolutionary game theory’ and its applications in 
social sciences, like Peyton Young’s (1998) works. They seem to be extremely sophisticated, 
and they use advanced mathematical techniques. 
TCS: I was fascinated by Maynard Smith’s work. I thought it was terrific. I like Peyton 
Young’s work. I think he remains too pure. He talks of this evolutionary process that brings 
about  norms.  Then  he  works  the  model  and  discovers  that,  because  he  has  a  lot  of 
stochasticity to begin with, inevitably if you wait long enough the norm will break down. 
What I tell Peyton is, once you got the norm people are no longer trying to make decisions 
the way they make them before there was a norm. Now people are going to notice the norm.  
If the norm is a man always opens the door for a woman, once you have the norm pretty soon   3 
all children will grow up knowing the norm, so the stochastic process that led up to the norm 
yields  to  the  fact  that  once  you  have  norm  people  can  internalize  the  norm,  they  can 
remember the norm, they can teach the norm, they can even put signs expressing the norm. 
Therefore, a lot of this fascinating work about how if you wait a million years the norm may 
break down, strikes me as not nearly as interesting as the fact that the norm can arise in the 
first place.  Most of the norms I abide by I do not abide by because the last twelve times I 
abided by them they worked, and therefore they will probably keep working.  
But I like his work. I also like some of Ken Binmore’s work, although I do not see lot of this 
type of work. Young and Binmore are not really much interested in simulation—compared 
with models that have solutions. But Peyton does take that very seriously. 
NEA: Of course, the game-theoretic treatment of conventions and norms began with David 
Lewis’s (1969) work and economists, such as Robert Sugden (1986), followed his lead. What 
do you think about this other trend in game theory? 
TCS: David Lewis was my student once. I think he got the idea from taking a course from 
me, and then he wrote his whole book on it—which is a very nice book. And there is Robert 
Sugden, who mainly uses solvable models rather than simulations. But I enjoy his work. 
Sugden, I think, has a political interest, sort of a libertarian interest, in showing that you do 
not need government. I do not think of these people as game theorists but as social theorists. 
If they did not tell you that they were using game theory, you would simply read it and say 
“this  is  theory—this  is  what  social  scientist  does”.  It  tends  to  look  a  little  more  like 
economics then like sociology, or political science, or anthropology, because economists, 
since the time of Cournot, are engaged in this kind of analysis. But you do not need to call it 
game theory. Somebody could do what Peyton Young does, and he may never have heard of 
game theory. 
If you want game theory to be only theory of conventions, then I think it is hopeless. If you 
want to see whether game theory can be of any help in thinking about which conventions 
come about, how they come about, how durable they may be when they come about, then I 
think game theory can help. But game theorists want the whole theory to be game theory.
2 
3.  The Checkerboard Model 
Thomas Schelling is awarded with the Nobel Prize “for having enhanced our understanding 
of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.” Of course, he has contributed 
much  to  our  understanding  of  coordination,  cooperation  and  conflict.  Yet  he  has  also 
contributed much to our understanding of the dynamics of residential segregation. In a series 
of papers and in Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Schelling (1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1972, 
1978) argued that residential segregation can be compatible with different micromotives; and 
even mild segregationist preferences (e.g. trying to avoid a minority status) can bring about 
residential segregation (see Aydinonat 2004). Thus, he proposed that residential segregation 
could  emerge  as  an  unintended  consequence  of  human  action.  Schelling’s  checkerboard 
model of segregation is regarded to be one of the examples of good explanation in social 
sciences (e.g. Sugden 2000) and the classical account of explaining with social mechanisms 
(e.g. Cowen 1998: 126). It is also considered as one of the paradigmatic examples of invisible 
                                                 
2   Prof. Schelling also mentioned that he was not satisfied with the theory of focal points, because game 
theorists were not interested in the real life consequences of focal points. When we were discussing the 
theory of focal points we concluded that the theory was flawed because it left out the conventions, and 
became a theory about coordination games with objects where the focal point is the result of the oddity of 
one of the objects (the odd one out).   4 
hand  explanations  (e.g.  Nozick  1974,  1994;  Ullmann-Margalit  1978)  and  one  of  the 
predecessors of agent-based computer models (e.g. Epstein & Axtel 1996, Rosser 1999, and 
Casti 1992). Consistent with the sprit of Schelling’s other works, the checkerboard model is a 
simple,  intuitive  and  influential  model.  Since  our  interest  in  this  interview  is  with  the 
methodological underpinnings of Schelling’s work it is appropriate to ask how Schelling 
came up with this model. The checkerboard model is very similar to cellular automata models 
and some argue that Schelling could have acquired his initial ideas at the RAND Corporation 
where cellular automata models were very popular.
3 
3.1.  Interview: Part II 
NEA: Could you please tell me how you came up with the checkerboard model of residential 
segregation? Did your affiliation with RAND have any affect on the formalization of this 
model? 
TCS:  I  was  at  RAND  in  the  summer  of  1967.  I  wrote  a  chapter  called  “the  process  of 
neighborhood tipping” (in Antony Pascal’s book) at RAND. Probably between the summer 
of 1967 and summer 1968 I did my checkerboard work. I took it to RAND and asked RAND 
to computerize it for me.
4 I kept on working on this issue for another year or two. But the 
checkerboard stuff I did not do at RAND and I did not get the idea at RAND.  
I had a strong intuition that you can get a lot of things like fairly extreme segregation through 
the dynamics of movement. And I was sure that there would be an existing literature on that. 
So, one summer when I was in RAND—RAND had a pretty good library—I got all of the 
bound volumes of two or three journals in sociology, believing I would find what I wanted to 
use in teaching in class about the interactive elements that would lead to unintended patterns. 
And I could not find anything. I decided, if I am going to teach my students, I'll have to make 
it all up. 
One day I was flying home from Chicago, and I did not have anything to read. I wondered 
what to do, and decided maybe now was the time to begin playing around with these ideas. 
So,  I  drew  a  line  on  a  sheet  of  paper,  put  down  sort  of  a  haphazard—not  random,  but 
haphazard—x’s and 0’s, and said now suppose I thought that these were blacks and whites, 
and both had ideas about neighbors. I started moving them around, even though I had to erase 
marks to move them, and was extremely clumsy, but by the time my plane landed in Boston I 
decided this was going to prove interesting. Then I went to work with coins--you do not have 
to erase them!  And then I wanted to do it in two dimensions. In one dimension you can 
simply move an item and insert it between two others.  But in two dimensions you have to 
have a more specific way of deciding where one can go. That is when I decided, well, I could 
use the checkerboard and leave blank squares so that the movement could get started. (I 
thought of hexagons, and decided squares were good enough.) 
I intended to use the result in teaching, I though they were interesting. A friend of mine was 
establishing the Journal of Mathematical Sociology. And he asked me if I would let him 
publish this in the first issue. That’s why it went into that journal. 
                                                 
3   For example, Philip Mirowski thinks that Schelling got the idea at RAND (private conversation). 
4   John  Casti  tried  to  computerize  the  model  but  he  was  not  successful  because  of  the  uncertainties  in 
Schelling’s  model.  Schelling  did  not  specify  what  happens  to  the  agents  on  the  edges,  for  example. 
However, we know that Casti (1992) uses a variation of Schelling’s checkerboard model in his book ‘Reality 
Rules’, when he is talking about cellular automata models.   5 
NEA: Although your model is cited as the predecessor of Cellular Automata (CA) type of 
modeling in the social sciences, it is also argued that James M. Sakoda was the first person 
who developed a CA based model in social sciences. Skoda’s (1971) “The checkerboard 
model of social interaction” appeared in the first issue of Journal of Mathematical Sociology 
with your paper on ‘residential segregation’. However, basic ideas of Sakoda’s model was 
already in his unpublished dissertation in 1949. Did you know his work? If you did, were you 
in anyway influenced by his approach? 
TCS: I have never heard of him. Some sociologists worked on social networking, which is a 
little like the checkerboard interactive models. And there used to be, I think in 1950’s, people 
who had computer games, one was called the game of life. They had rules about who would 
survive and who would die according to neighbors. And they played around with the various 
interesting shapes that could occur. But I do not remember that they ever used it to model 
social phenomena. I think they just used it as abstract configuration formation. 
I knew about some examples of Cellular Automata, or whatever you want to call them. But it 
was not until about five years ago that I discovered that some people thought that I had 
originated that kind of thing. Peyton Young once started talking to me about this kind of 
thing, and I said “oh, I have actually published something on that”, and gave him my book. 
He had not been aware of it, but then he saw it, and when he published his book recently he 
mentioned me as sort of a pioneer, or a predecessor. And I think Josh Epstein talks about me 
as being a precursor. And I met somebody in Vienna, I do not remember his name, who was 
doing something like that. And long time ago I discovered, somebody told me that, there 
were some physical models, I think something in crystal formation. Somebody was referring 
to ISING model, which was a well-known model of, I think, crystal formation. And it seemed 
to be reminiscent of what I did, and they were interested in whether if examined in detail the 
analogy would be preserved at the local detail of the molecules of whatever it was. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This short interview contains valuable insights about how Thomas Schelling approaches to 
modeling and game theory. One of the novelties of Schelling’s models and approach is that 
they  suggest  a  previously  unrecognized  aggregate  mechanism  (e.g.,  a  mechanism  of 
residential segregation, or of coordination) by way of explicating the interactions of certain 
individual mechanisms (e.g., individuals who are trying to avoid a minority status, or to 
coordinate). Such explanations are appealing because we are familiar with the individual 
mechanisms and surprising for we did not think about the certain way in which they may 
interact in bringing about the explanandum phenomenon. It remains to be analyzed how and 
to what extent Schelling’s approach differs from the mainstream approach to modeling in 
economics.    
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